Is there such a thing as an optimal government size? We investigate by the nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) the so-called 'Armey curve' which claims an inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and economic performance.
Introduction
During the second half of the last century, government involvement in OECD-countries expanded rapidly. Whereas the size of the tax burden (i.e., the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) was 24.7% in 1960, the tax burden reached an average of 36.3% in 2003. Many theories for the growth of government have been o¤ered. Wagner's law (1877) states that the demand for governmental services has an income elasticity in excess of one. Baumol (1967) blames the unbalanced growth between the private and public sectors, Niskanen (1971) bureaucratic expansionism. Other theories mention interest-group lobbying, …scal illusion or public-employee bloc voting (for an overview see, e.g., Lybeck and Henrekson 1988; Meltzer and Richard 1983; ) .
These theories have in common that government expansion is inherent and continuous.
Although it has been argued by Higgs (1987) that due to the ratchet e¤ect the size of goverment increases permanently, we observe for a sample of 23 OECD countries that from the end of the 1990s on, government involvement measured by the general tax burden, slowed down and even decreased. We illustrate this in Figure 1 where we measure the tax burden for OECD and EU-15 countries by taking two-year intervals. Focusing on the last 16 years, we present the tax burden for the 23 0ECD countries in Figure 2 . This paper follows the stream of economists which insists on downsizing government, although this is an intricate issue as the civil servants themselves have many political powers (Buchanan and Tullock, 1977) . In Section 1, we explain the arguments for downsizing the goverment by the so-called 'Armey curve' (Armey 1995) . The conceptual starting point is a society without a government. The absence of government allows lawlessness, insecurity and instability. Even a small government could advance welfare by introducing the protection of property rights and the rule of law. But the richer society gets, the more government gets involved (Slemrod et al. 1995) . The median voter prefers state-of-the-art health care, education and pension systems. As the scope of the government grows, so do the tax burden and public expenditures. Public choice theory predicts that governments will expand in size beyond its e¢cient level: higher public expenditures result in a lower GDP growth.
Advocates of the Armey curve try to estimate the e¢cient level of government involvement.
They obtain optimal values which are lower than the current observations.
The parametric regressions applied to estimate the optimal government size face some drawbacks which are circumvented by the non-parametric estimation in Section 2. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop an alternative approach to determining the optimal size of the government. By applying an input-oriented model (i.e., minimization of the inputs for a given output level) on a sample of 23 OECD countries, we benchmark governments by comparing GDP growth relative to their tax burdens. In a …rst stage analysis, we investigate the variables as proposed by Armey (1995) . We measure the size of the government by overall government spending (general government outlays). These expenditures include the spendings from the central, state and local government as well as spendings by the social security system (cfr. Gupta et al. 2001 ). Other measures of government size are also popular. Meltzer and Richard (1981) use the share of income redistributed by government as a measure of relative size. Katsimi (1998) de…nes the size of the public sector as the ratio of public to total employment. Others use the total tax level or the share of government consumption in total consumption. As these measures of government size are strongly correlated (e.g., correlation of 0.88 between public spending and overall taxation level), our results remain robust for related measures.
In a second stage, we correct the …rst stage gross e¢ciency measures. As a …rst correction variable, we develop the idea of the anorexia family. Countries with lean family sizes prefer larger government involvement, since the public sector takes over several concerns which used to be handled within the family. Family size is considered as an implicit revelation of the preference for the extent of government involvement. Other correction factors are openness of the economy (Roderik 1996) , initial GDP per capita to capture the catching up e¤ect (Wagner 1877 ) and the income of the median voter, urbanization, country size (proxied by the total population), population density and the capital stock (proxy of physical capital stock).
In methodological terms, this paper develops a simple procedure to correct the DEA e¢-ciency scores for environmental characteristics by using the residuals of the Tobit regressions.
We extend the procedure as suggested by Gasparani and Ramos (2003) to a more generous correction mechanism. The optimal size of the public sector is computed as the actual size times the adjusted net e¢ciency score. We do not consider the in ‡uences of outliers nor measurement errors. From the outset, it should be emphasized that our approach o¤ers only a partial analysis. As such, we do not investigate the crucial issue of equity, i.e., the interpersonal redistribution of opportunities, income and wealth. Furthermore, in the context of political economy, the many dimensions of 'eudemonia' (good life and happiness) are not covered except for the contribution from real growth.
Our results show that, on average, the public sector of the 23 OECD countries which constitute our sample should decrease by 3.74 percentage points to reach an overall tax burden of 41.22% of GDP. The Italian public sector, followed by the Swedish, would be prone to the largest decrease with, respectively, 10.24 and 7.88 percentage points. Public spending in New Zealand appears to be too low and could thus increase.
1 Is there an optimal government size?
The Armey curve
The search for an optimal size of government has been popularized by Armey (1995) . The so-called 'Armey curve', which is represented in Figure 3 , describes the relationship between the growth of the economy and the size of the public sector (where tax burden is a proxy). If the government has no resources (i.e., zero taxation level), the growth rate of the economy corresponds to G 0 . In a world without rule of law, private agents have to protect their own property rights. The establishment of a government skims some income, but creates a higher growth rate by introducing the provision of public goods and services which increases overall economic e¢ciency. At low levels of government spending, an increase in the tax rate raises the growth rate since the outlays (e.g., for infrastructure, education, public health, protection of property) are considered to be productive (Scully 2003) . However, whereas the …rst euros spent have huge marginal e¤ects, the next euros have smaller e¤ects. For example, once a country possesses primary roads, the positive e¤ects of secondary roads are smaller. In addition, as higher taxes are needed to …nance government, distortions usually become more prevalent. Agents change their behavior in order to escape taxes. Public choice theory also predicts that the government o¢cials become increasingly self-interested and not benevolent (see Mueller (2003) for an overview). Therefore, the curve has a concave shape due to decreasing marginal returns: a proportional increase in spending and taxation yields a less than proportional increase in economic growth. But thanks to positive externalities, an additional percentage of tax burden still creates higher economic e¢ciency (i.e., a positive At some point, the marginal bene…ts from increased government spending become zero.
With a tax burden of T , the government induces the highest possible rate of economic growth. Beyond T , government spending is more oriented towards non-productive spending (e.g., transfers and subsidies). An increase in the tax rate then lowers the growth rate of the economy.
In contrast with what has come before, the additional resources claimed by the government come at the cost of private projects with higher returns.
Estimation of the optimal government size
The empirical literature provides several attempts to estimate the optimal level of the public sector. We mention some studies. Based on a model of endogenous growth, Barro (1990) countries with lean public sectors and with public expenditure ratios of about 30% of GDP tend to be the most e¢cient countries in terms of public performance. As we show below, our results are somewhat similar, in that we estimate the average optimal size for the OECD countries to be around 40% of GDP with a standard deviation of 5%.
Drawbacks of a parametric estimation
Although the Armey curve represents an attractive conceptual framework, it su¤ers from a few drawbacks which make an empirical estimation of the curve rather inadequate. Some In addition, parametric models assume a priori a particular functional form on the dataset, which is di¢cult to justify. We suggest an alternative exploration by estimating the optimal tax burden by use of the non-parametric 'Data Envelopment Analysis' (DEA). This procedure allows us to compare governments and to benchmark their long term achievements.
We are able to correct for control variables, such as the openness of a country or preferences about government involvement in the economy (see infra). In this paper, we follow a top- We consider the input-oriented model which searches for the minimal inputs needed to produce given outputs. The e¢ciency of a DMU is obtained as the maximum of the ratio of the weighted sum of its outputs to the weighted sum of its inputs, subject to the condition that this ratio for any DMU does not exceed 1. This condition means that no DMU can operate beyond the e¢ciency frontier. We further assume non-negative weights. If there are m inputs x i , s outputs y r and n DMUs (indexed by j " f1; 2; : : : ; ng), we state the BCC-problem as a simple linear programming formulation:
The inputs and outputs, labelled with a i subscript, are the inputs and outputs of DM U i whose e¢ciency is being evaluated. The problem needs to be solved for every DMU. The technical e¢ciency score of DM U i is de…ned as the value of i . If i equals 1, the DMU is relatively e¢cient. If i is less than 1, it could produce, given its inputs, (1 i ) percent more outputs. We consider i as a gross e¢ciency measure which we will further correct for control variables in order to obtain an adjusted net e¢ciency measure.
Consider the case where there is only one input variable in an input-oriented model.
Multiplying the e¢ciency score i by the only input value, we obtain the targeted input value. This targeted input value indicates the optimal input for the DMU, given its output.
We compute the optimal size of the government by the use of this optimal target value.
Advantages of DEA
To our best knowledge, the optimum of the Armey curve has been estimated only by the use of parametric methods. In this contribution, we apply an input-oriented DEA model to the problem (i.e., minimization of the inputs for a given amount of outputs). Although one of the advantages of DEA is the use of multiple inputs and outputs, we compute the model only for one input and one output variable. The tax burden is used as the input variable, and GDP growth as the output variable. This is consistent with the idea behind the Armey curve: for a given GDP growth rate, what is the optimal level of tax burden? By the use of DEA, we calculate for every country an optimal government size relative to the observed performances of the other countries in the dataset. In other words, we benchmark the governments by relating a country's economic growth to the size of its government. Since DEA is a nonparametric estimation procedure, we do not need any a priori assumption about the shape of the production function, as is required in the literature estimating an inverted U-shape.
Moreover, in a second step, we will take into account control variables (e.g., openness of the country) and preferences (e.g., redistribution towards families).
The analysis covers OECD economies. Studying only OECD countries o¤ers several advantages (see, e.g., Alesina and Furceri 2008) . Firstly, data quality and comparability are of higher standards. Comparability is the more important due to the relative nature of the DEA technique. Secondly, data from OECD and non-OECD countries do not share a common set of coe¢cients in growth regressions (Grier and Tullock 1989 ). As such, it is di¢cult to pool these data. Finally, and related to the previous point, the economic structures in emerging OECD countries di¤er from those in mature economies. Therefore, we considere a sample of 23 reasonably comparable OECD countries. We borrow the data from the OECD statistical databases and evaluate the year 1999 (due to data constraints for family size, see infra). Nevertheless, we experimented with other years as well. As mentioned earlier, the output variable is GDP growth. 1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is preferred above Gross National Product (GNP) as GDP yields a better correlation with the economic activity within a country. The degree of government involvement is measured by the level of general government spending (total outlays). General government spending is the sum of the spendings by the central, state and local government, as well as social security spendings.
The input-oriented e¢ciency scores are presented in the …rst column of Table 1 . We learn from this exercise that Ireland and the United States allocate the levied taxes most e¢ciently.
For a given GDP growth, their governments need the smallest tax absorption. The Swedish and Danish governments spend according to the gross e¢ciency scores the collected taxes in the least e¢cient way in order to push GDP. The average gross e¢ciency score is 0.75. This means that, if governments would perform e¢ciently (i.e., as the US and Irish governments), they would only need 75% of the current taxation level.
Correction for exogenous in ‡uences
To improve the comperability of the sample, we make corrections for preferences and some other control variables. By the use of a specially designed econometric procedure, we correct the gross e¢ciency scores to obtain net e¢ciency values. We …rst introduce and explore the concept of the anorexia family. Figure 4) . One could say that the anorexia family emerges. The question remains as what extent this decline in family size re ‡ects government involvement.
Empirically, we …nd a strong negative correlation (-0.80) between family size and overall government taxes measured as a percentage of GDP and between family size and government spending (-0.55) (see Figure 5 for 1999 data).
On the one hand, the anorexia family invites the government to take up more tasks.
Whereas before, for instance, families themselves looked after their younger and older members, crèches and resthomes supported by the government often ful…l that requirement nowadays. Several tasks which formerly were family responsibilities are nowadays assigned to the welfare state. On the other hand, thanks to extended government involvement, families could emaciate. Governments provide, for instance, pension allowances such that children are no longer the only safeguards for retired parents. 2 Although we …nd a strong correlation, we do not know the direction of the causality.
In further research, this causality should be carefully examined by Instrumental Variables (IV) techniques. 3 To present a ‡avor of the correlation between the family size and the government size, by use of an ordinary least squares estimation, we test the hypothesis that, for 23 OECD-countries, a smaller family size yields a larger government involvement. The results are presented in Table 2 . Family size alone can explain 30.5% of the variation in taxation levels. We also checked whether the results remain robust if we add per capita GDP as an explanatory variable.
There exists a large and growing public …nance literature on the relationship between government involvement and family size. A large part of the literature focuses on the link between fertility, growth and government size. This branch is based on the inspiring paper of Galor and Weil (1996) . Another branch of the literature discusses the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation (e.g., Cremer et al. 2003) . However, to our best In the remainder of this section, we consider family size to represent an implicit preference for the extent of government involvement. Societies which prefer a larger government involvement (e.g., Denmark with general government spending equal to 52.5% of GDP in 1999), have on average smaller families (i.e., Denmark counts only 2.14 members in 1999).
Due to the unknown causality is the reverse also true: societies with lean public sectors (e.g., Spain with 38.3% of GDP), have on average bigger families (i.e., Spain counts 3.24 family members). If we consider total 'social' expenditures, which are measured as the sum of resources spend for families, disabled persons, the unemployed, elderly people and sick persons, as an explicit measure for government involvement, we …nd a signi…cant negative correlation (-0.65) between explicit and implicit preferences. Family size can explain 38.5%
of the variation in total social expenditures (see Table 3 and Figure 6 ).
Other control variables
The countries in the sample di¤er in several aspects. First of all, di¤erent countries have di¤erent tastes and preferences about the optimal size of government. We capture preferences for the extent of government involvement by the average family size. Countries with lean families prefer larger government involvement as argued in the previous section.
Secondly, we correct for the degree of countries' openness to trade. Open countries are more subject to external shocks and therefore need a larger public sector to accomplish a stabilizing role (Roderik 1996) . We measure the degree of openness by computing the sum of However, we consider this procedure as 'too severe'. Some governments could be 'inef…cient' simply because they are too small. Those governments could, by increasing the tax burden, obtain a larger GDP growth. The adjusted e¢ciency score as obtained by equation (2) fails to detect those ine¢cient governments. Therefore, we extend the procedure of Gasparini and Ramos (2003) to a more general correction mechanism. Our suggestion is to consider not only the largest residual, but an average of the w largest residuals. Hence, we sort the residuals i in order of magnitude and compute:
Obviously, the relative rigour of the correction depends on the number w by which the residuals are corrected. The larger is w, the less severe is the correction and, hence, the larger is the average optimal public sector. As we do not know the proper value of w, we further perform a sensitivity analysis.
Sizing the government
The results of the estimation are given in Table 1 . The left column in the Table represents the uncorrected gross e¢ciency scores. By estimating a Tobit regression, we correct the gross e¢ciency scores. The Tobit estimation is presented in Table 4 . Family size, openness of the economy, country size, population density and urbanization have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the e¢ciency of the DEA model. As capital stock has a very insigni…cant e¤ect, we removed it from the results. Family size has the expected positive e¤ect on gross e¢ciency.
The larger the average family, the higher the gross e¢ciency. Hence, countries with larger average family size (and thus preferences for less government involvement), can create a given GDP growth with fewer government spendings. Since larger exports decrease e¢ciency, Roderik's stabilizing e¤ect emerges. GDP per capita shows a positive but insigni…cant e¤ect on the e¢ciency: the richer the country, the higher the gross e¢ciency. Both country size, population density and urbanization in ‡uence the gross e¢ciency scores positively.
As also the size of the e¤ect is of importance, we present in Figure 7 the e¤ect on the mean of each of the signi…cant variables. We observe that the e¤ect of the household size has the largest in ‡uence on e¢ciency. Urbanization, population density and population have clearly a lower e¤ect on the mean.
Since we are primarily interested in the residuals which we obtain from the Tobit regression, the …nding whether a certain variable has a signi…cant impact on the e¢ciency score does not matter so much for our purpose. The residuals are reproduced in the second column of Table 1 . From the residuals, we compute the net e¢ciency scores by use of equation (3) with w arbitrarily set to, e.g., 3 (later on, we perform a sensitivity analysis). The optimal size is computed as the government size times the adjusted net e¢ciency score.
From comparing the gross and the net e¢ciency scores, we learn that all countries, except In order to test the robustness of w in determining the size of the optimal government involvement, we perform a sensitivity analysis. We compute for several values of w the optimal tax burden. The results are presented in Table 5 . Notice that, as w increases, the optimal size of government rises as well. The di¤erence between However, even in a very generous model (i.e., w equal to 7), most governments would have to decrease spending by 2.41 percentage points in order to obtain higher GDP growth.
Only New Zealand should decrease its tax burden in none of the models. Australia and United Kingdom should optimally increase the government size from the moment we correct by taking w as 7.
Public sector performance
Economic growth is not the only objective that a benevolent government can pursue. Musgrave (1959) de…ned three major tasks for the government: (1) allocative e¢ciency, (2) economic stability and (3) cator 'Public Sector Performance' (PSP) by equal weighting of these seven sub-indicators.
We investigate whether the optimal size of the government changes if we use the PSPindicator in the …rst step of the DEA-model. In this setting, the government has to minimise spending, while ful…lling a whole set of public activities. In the DEA input-model, government spending remains the input, while PSP becomes the output variable. Once more we correct for implicit preferences (family size as proxy), openness, GDP per capita, country size, population density and urbanization. The results are given in Table 6 . Table 6 with PSP as output in the …rst step, slightly di¤ers from Table 1 
Concluding remarks
Government involvement expanded rapidly in the second part of the last century. Many economists insist on downsizing the government. Their arguments are based on the socalled 'Armey curve'. We indicate that these estimates rely on unrealistic assumptions, the ignorance of preferences and a confusion of correlation with causation. We …nd a strong negative correlation between family size and overall government size. On the one hand, where *** and ** denote, respectively, signi…cance at 1 and 5% level.
the anorexia family forces the government to take up more tasks. On the other hand, as government involvement expands, families could emancipate.
We estimate by the use of a non-parametric 'Data Envelopment Analysis' (DEA) the gross e¢ciency of government spendings (1999 data). In a second stage, these gross-scores are corrected by linking them to classic control variables such as initial per capita income (Wagner 1877), degree of openness (Roderik 1996) , country size, population density and urbanization. We introduce family size as a novel explanatory variable. By the use of a generous correction mechanism, we compute the optimal size of the government. 
